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McNamara, Robert S.; Blight, James G.; Biersteker, Thomas J.; Brigham, Robert K.; Schandler, Herbert Y. ListingsIf you cannot find what you want on this page, then please use our search feature to search all our listings. Click on Title to view full description
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McNamara, Robert S.; Blight, James G.; Biersteker, Thomas J.; Brigham, Robert K.; Schandler, Herbert Y. Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy
New York, New York, U.S.A. Public Affairs Press 1999 1891620223 / 9781891620225 First Edition Hard Cover Fine Fine
Near-new condition. Appears unread. Stated First Edition - NO remainder marks or price clippings. Tight spine - Bright pages. 479 pages. Illustrated. NO writing, marks or tears inside book. - A few years ago Robert McNamara offered his apologia to the nation in In Retrospect , his memoir of the Vietnam War that was critical of administration policy and weakness. That was a good start to explain how the war became such a political mess and a military blunder. But it only examined one side of the conflict. Now, in Argument Without End , McNamara brings the Vietnamese into the discussion as he moderates dialogues with 30 American scholars, former U.S. government officials, and Vietnamese military men, journalists, and academics. It's a historic gathering of experts and key players, coming together to hash out what led to the war and what made it so intractably long. Made up largely of transcripts from conversations and interviews with the book's contributors, Argument Without End offers analysis that will no doubt cause academic and Beltway debate. Most striking is the group's conclusion that the U.S. could never have won the war. That conclusion, in and of itself, is not wholly new. The war's detractors have been saying it for decades, and even some who were powerful supporters have since reconsidered the wisdom of sending hundreds of thousands of U.S. soldiers to fight in Southeast Asia. But never has a group as central to the conflict as this applied their knowledge to reach the sad conclusion that, perhaps, only hindsight allows. Here, then, are the names and biographies of those McNamara gathered to examine the United States' worst military defeat. From The Critics Jack F. Matlock Jr. - The New York Times Book Review ...[B]ased on conversations between Americans and Vietnamese who were active in their respective countries when the war started....The most riveting part...contains the transcripts of discussions by American and Vietnamese participants in a series of conferences. The Americans are to be commended for using the meetings to test the accuracy of their previous views rather than defending them. The Vietnamese generally maintained that they were right all along, though some spoke with greater candor as the sessions progressed. Publishers Weekly Erroneous mindsets, mutual ignorance and misunderstandings between Washington and Hanoi drove the escalation of of the Vietnam War, concludes former Secretary of Defense McNamara in a challenging report full of revelations both fascinating and appalling. Based on six sets of talks held in Hanoi between 1995 and 1998 that brought together U.S. and Vietnamese scholars, policy makers and former military officers, this major reappraisal of the war is presented as a critical oral history. Among the meetings participants were McNamara, Nicholas Katzenbach (former deputy secretary of state), General Vo Nguyen Giap (ex-North Vietnamese defense minister) and Vietnams retired foreign minister Nguyen Co Thach. During the talks, McNamara writes, he was amazed to learn that Hanoi saw U.S. peace initiatives as part of a sinister plot to establish a permanent colonial regime in Saigon. Washington, misperceiving North Vietnam as a communist puppet bent on conquering all of Southeast Asia, let a mind-boggling number of opportunities slip by that might have averted war or brought a negotiated settlement. We learn that elements within Hanois top leadership wanted to accept a neutral Saigon coalition government; we are told that key escalation points (e.g., the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin attack) were not ordered by Hanoi to target Americans, as Washington assumed, but were decentralized decisions made for essentially local reasons. While it would be easy to dismiss this book as a self-flagellating exercise in hindsight, its unprecedented testimony by key players on both sides makes it an invaluable sequel to McNamaras 1995 bestseller, In Retrospect. Photos not seen by PW. (May) Library Journal McNamara, the former secretary of defense under presidents Kennedy and Johnson, argues that the war was a tragedy for both sides primarily because American and North Vietnamese leaders missed opportunities for avoiding war and later for ending it earlier. He and his coauthors detail the sometimes intense talks they and other American scholars and former officials had with 16 of their former Vietnamese adversaries in meetings held in Hanoi, from 1995 to 1998. The authors' presentation of Vietnamese analyses and other documentation greatly aids American understanding of the war and prevents the book from merely restating McNamara's In Retrospect (LJ 4/15/95). This work, bound to be controversial, is a crucial addition for public and academic libraries.--Charles L. Lumpkins, Pennsylvania State Univ., State College Copyright 1999 Cahners Business Information. Jack F. Matlock, Jr. - The New York Times Book Review ...[B]ased on conversations between Americans and Vietnamese who were active in their respective countries when the war started....The most riveting part...contains the transcripts of discussions by American and Vietnamese participants in a series of conferences. The Americans are to be commended for using the meetings to test the accuracy of their previous views rather than defending them. The Vietnamese generally maintained that they were right all along, though some spoke with greater candor as the sessions progressed. Don Ross - USA Today Argument Without End probes in excruciating detail the political, diplomatic and military decisions of Vietnam. In a surprisingly cumbersome format, given McNamara's reputation as an organization wizard U.S.-Vietnamese relations are examined...
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McNamara, Robert S.; Blight, James G.; Biersteker, Thomas J.; Brigham, Robert K.; Schandler, Herbert Y. on Beaglebooks.com
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